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I.

NA TURE OF THE CASE
Appellant/Plaintiff St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center (St. Luke's) had no

attorney-client relationship with Respondent/Defendant Thomas R. Luciani and Stamper,
Rubens, Stocker & Smith, P .S. (collectively Luciani). Luciani did defend a Twin Falls Countyowned hospital, Magic Valley Regional Medical Center (the Hospital), in litigation alleging
wrongful termination and a violation of the False Claims Act related to fraudulent Medicare
billing (the Suter Litigation). Luciani was replaced by other counsel and his representation of the
County-owned Hospital ended on March 14,2006, when the substitution of counsel was filed.
Twin Falls County thereafter sold the Hospital to St. Luke's pursuant to a Sale and Lease
Agreement. St. Luke's, as part of the consideration for the purchase of certain Twin Falls
County assets, assumed liability for the Suter Litigation. St. Luke's settled the Suter Litigation
four years after Luciani was replaced as counsel.
In January 2008, St. Luke's brought this legal malpractice action against Luciani in the
United States District Court for the District ofIdaho. St. Luke's contends it can proceed against
Luciani for legal malpractice based on the terms of the Sale and Lease Agreement executed on
March 16,2006 between Twin Falls County and St. Luke's and closed on July 1, 2006. While
St. Luke's has been described as Luciani's former client's successor, more accurately this case
involves a business asset purchaser seeking to pursue a legal malpractice claim against one of the
seller's attorneys. The Sale and Lease Agreement contains no specific assignment of a legal
malpractice claim against Luciani. (Order Certifying Question to Idaho Supreme Court
(D. Idaho Oct. 27, 2011) (Order), pp. 2-3). In fact, it contains no reference to legal malpractice

at all. St. Luke's assignment argument fails for three reasons: (1) Idaho, like the vast majority
of states, does not permit assignment oflegal malpractice claims; (2) even if assignment was
permitted under Idaho law, no effective assignment was made under Idaho law; and (3) Twin
Falls had no legal malpractice claim to assign.
Luciani sought summary judgment. On October 28,2011, the United States District
Court (the Honorable Edward J. Lodge) issued an order certifying to this Court the following
question: "Does Idaho law allow legal malpractice claims to be assigned," recognizing the
answer may be dispositive of this case. (Order, pp. 1,6). Luciani respectfully requests this
Court answer the certified question in the negative.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

Twin Falls County Was Luciani's Client.

Until July 1, 2006, Magic Valley Regional Medical Center (the Hospital) was a Twin
Falls County-owned facility. 1 (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 7; Tompkins Supp. Dec. Ex. C). Twin Falls
County, the Hospital's owner during the time period of Luciani's representation of the Hospital,
was Luciani's client. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 4 and Ex. 7).

I The record in this case consists primarily of the exhibits attached to the Declaration of
Christopher W. Tompkins in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Tompkins
Dec.); Declaration of Gregory D. Call in support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment (Call Dec.); Declaration of Ann S. Taylor Pitts in Support of Plaintiffs
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Pitts Dec.); Declaration of Dennis
Barry in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Barry
Dec.) and Supplemental Declaration of Christopher W. Tompkins in Support of Defendants'
Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment (Tompkins Supp. Dec). The record cites will be to the
Declaration and the exhibit numbers.
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B.

St. Luke's Did Not, Pursuant to the Sale and Lease Agreement, Succeed to
the Ownership of Luciani's Client, Which Was Twin Falls County.

In its appellate brief, St. Luke's states "[i]n July 2006 Magic Valley sold substantially all
of its assets and liabilities to St. Luke's." (Appellant's Brief, p. 1). This is factually inaccurate.
It was Twin Falls County as owner that sold to St. Luke's Health System Ltd., St. Luke's
Regional Medical Center Ltd. and St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center Ltd.
(collectively referred to as "St. Luke's"), as buyer, certain County-owned assets as set out in the
parties' March 16,2006 "Sale and Lease Agreement for the Creation ofa New Health System"
(hereinafter "Agreement"). (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 7). St. Luke's was a new entity, created to own
and operate the Hospital after the asset purchase from Twin Falls County.2 (Id.)
The Hospital did not merely "change its name." Before the asset purchase, Twin Falls
County owned the Hospital; Magic Valley was the name for the county operation. (Id.) Twin
Falls County sold and/or leased assets to St. Luke's, which operates as an entirely different
entity. So while St. Luke's took over ownership of certain buildings and the Hospital's business,
it did not succeed to the ownership of Luciani's client, Twin Falls County. Although Twin Falls
County no longer owns the Hospital, Twin Falls County still exists.
Article II of the Agreement identifies the Twin Falls County assets to be leased, sold,
assigned and transferred to St. Luke's. (!d.) Twin Falls County agreed to assign to St. Luke's
"[a]ll of the Hospital's contracts, agreements and leases (collectively, the "Assigned Agreements"), and all of the benefits and burdens of such Assigned Agreements, to the extent such

St. Luke's has since built and moved to a new facility in Twin Falls County.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6, n.2).
2

3

Assigned Agreements are assignable." (Id. at Agreement 2.2(b)). Under Section 2.5, entitled
"Other Property," and except for certain specified excluded assets, the parties agreed that it was
their intent "that all property and interests of the Hospital, whether real or personal, tangible or
intangible, be leased, sold, assigned, licensed or transferred" by Twin Falls County. (Id. at
Agreement Section 2.5).
The Agreement contains no explicit reference to legal malpractice claims or to the
assignment of such claims. The Agreement does not state that a legal malpractice claim was
included in the Agreement, or even that such a claim was contemplated at the time of the
Agreement. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 7).
C.

St. Luke's Chose to Assume Liability for the Pending Suter Litigation
Instead of Paying More in Cash for the County's Assets.

St. Luke's exposure in the Suter Litigation occurred only because it chose to assume that
liability as currency for its purchase and lease of Twin Falls County assets, instead ofleaving
that liability with Twin Falls County and paying more in cash for these assets. (!d. at Agreement
Art. III). "As part of the consideration for the Hospital Assets," St. Luke's agreed to "assume all

debts, liabilities and obligations" ofthe Hospital as of the closing date. (Id.) Excluded were
certain liabilities that are "subject to the Idaho Tort Claims Act and are covered and paid by
insurance." (Id.)
One of the liabilities assumed by St. Luke's was the Suter Litigation, disclosed in
Schedule 17.6 and page 5 of the Updated Due Diligence Questionnaire and Document Request
attached to the Agreement. (Tompkins SUpp. Dec. Ex. C & D). St. Luke's knew, when it chose
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to assume liability for the Suter Litigation, that the Suter plaintiffs sought damages in excess of
$18 million. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 26). St. Luke's also knew that the Hospital's insurer was
refusing to pay for Luciani's replacement counsel- the law firm of McDermott, Will & Emory,
LLP (McDermott). (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 56).
The Agreement permits St. Luke's to seek indemnity from Twin Falls County ifthe
assumed liabilities proved to be materially greater than represented. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 7 Art.
XV, Section 15.1 (b)). No such indemnity has been sought.
The transactions contemplated by the Agreement closed on July 1, 2006. (Tompkins
Dec. Ex. 7 Art. XIII Sec. 13.2(a); Ex. 74 & 75). Several operative documents were signed at
closing to effectuate the transfers promised in the Agreements. (Id.; Tompkins Dec. Ex. 76).
The Bill of Sale transferred certain assets from Twin Falls County to St. Luke's. (Tompkins
Dec. Ex. 74). A Quitclaim Deed transferred certain real property to St. Luke's. (Tompkins Dec.
Ex. 75). None of the documents signed refer to or purport to transfer any legal malpractice
claim. (!d.)
Twin Falls County and St. Luke's, both sophisticated parties, knew how to effect an
explicit assignment and transfer of rights. These entities executed an Assignment and
Assumption Agreement (Assignment) among Twin Falls County, St. Luke's and McDermott
dated June 30, 2006, which contains a specific and explicit assignment and assumption of rights
and responsibilities relating to McDermott. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 76). Under this Agreement,
St. Luke's became obligated to McDermott under its retainer agreement with the Hospital,
effective July 1, 2006. (ld.)
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D.

Three Suter Lawsuits Were Pending Against the Hospital When St. Luke's
Assumed Liability.

At the time of the Agreement, the Hospital had three lawsuits pending against it, all
initiated by Cherri Suter and Mindy Harmer (Suter Plaintiffs). In August 2001, the Suter
Plaintiffs filed suit in Idaho State Court against the Hospital alleging retaliatory discharge and
various causes of action in connection with alleged breaches of their employment contracts.
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 9). This suit is entitled Cornerstone Therapy LLC, Cheri Suter and Randy
Suter, individually and as wife and husband, Mindy Harmer and Eric Herzog, individually and
as wife and husband v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, a political subdivision of Twin
Falls County and John Does I-X (Id.)

The Hospital employed local counsel Kent Taylor (Taylor) and his daughter, Ann Taylor
Pitts (Pitts), who acted essentially as the Hospital's general counsel. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 11;
Stanger Depo. p. 60). The Hospital was initially defended in the state court Suter Litigation by
Kim Stanger and the firm of Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley. (Id. at Stanger Depo. p. 58).
Stanger began his representation ofthe Hospital in July 2001. (Id., p. 59). Mr. Stanger's
representation of the Hospital was paid for by Twin Falls County's insurer, Truck Insurance
Exchange (Truck). (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 2; Taylor Depo. pp. 16-18).
At a 2002 mediation of the Suter Plaintiffs' state court wrongful termination claims, the
Suter Plaintiffs indicated their intent to file a False Claims Act action against the Hospital for
fraudulent Medicare billing practices. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 11; Stanger Depo., pp. 58, 59, 81,
121). In January of 2003, the Suter Plaintiffs did file that action in the United States District
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Court for the District of Idaho. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 12). The action alleged the Hospital
violated provisions of the Federal False Claims Act by submitting fraudulent claims for
reimbursement to Medicare for rehabilitation services provided in the Transitional Care Unit
(TCU) from July 1998 through October 2000. The Suter Plaintiffs brought the suit as a Qui Tam
action, in the name of the United States government (hereinafter referred to as the "False Claims
Act Litigation" or the "Qui Tam action"). (Id.)
In March of 2003, the Suter Plaintiffs filed a third Complaint/second Federal Court
Complaint in Idaho Federal Court, entitled Cherri Suter, Randy Suter, Mindy Harmer, Eric

Herzog and Cornerstone Therapy, LLC v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center. (Tompkins
Dec. Ex. 13). The Complaint included various causes of action for wrongful termination and
breach of an employment contract. The Idaho state employment action was stayed pending
resolution of the federal employment action. The federal employment action was subsequently
consolidated with the Suter Plaintiffs' Qui Tam action. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 65, pp. 6-7).

E.

Luciani Defended the Hospital in the Suter Litigation Beginning in July
2003.

In July of 2003, John Kee, the Hospital's CEO, removed Stanger as counsel for the
Hospital in the Suter Litigation because he "did not get a real strong feeling that [Stanger]
believed in our case and was an advocate for the hospital." (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 14; Kee Depo.
pp. 110-111). Kee handled all communications with Stanger through the Hospital's counsel,
Taylor and Pitts. (Id., p. 113). Kee asked Pitts to find someone "that could appropriately
represent us and provide the defense that we were required to have." (Id. pp. 158-159).
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Taylor, at Kee's request, took over management of the file from the Hospital's risk
manager. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 16; Fisher Depo. p. 119). Kee's comment to the Hospital's risk
manager was Stanger "didn't know what he was doing." (Id., p. 120).
In July 2003, Luciani and his law firm were retained by the Hospital, through its insurer,
to replace Stanger. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 2; Taylor Depo. pp. 16-17; Ex. 14; Kee Depo. pp. 116117). Luciani is a litigation lawyer who primarily practices in eastern Washington and northern
Idaho. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 17; Luciani Depo. p. 15). Luciani gathered facts and evidence. He
participated in depositions and interviews. He conducted research and prepared the case for trial.
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 18).
Luciani interviewed the Hospital executives, investigated allegations related to the Suter
Litigation by speaking with numerous current and former employees of the Hospital and
employees of co-defendant National Rehabilitation Partners (NRP), worked with Hospital
executives and employees to respond to discovery, and defended Hospital employees, executives
and former employees' depositions. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 18, 19,20,21,22,23,24,25).
Whenever depositions or other events occurred, Luciani met with Hospital executives
and/or Taylor/Pitts to discuss what occurred and its significance. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 17;
Luciani Depo. pp. 150-51). His billing records reflect that he met with or participated in
telephone calls with Hospital executives and with the Hospital's general counsel Taylor/Pitts on
at least 39 occasions. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 18).
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F.

Luciani's Representation of the Hospital Ended Before the Execution of the
Twin Falls County/St. Luke's Agreement.

The Suter Litigation expert disclosure deadline required the Suter Plaintiffs' expert
reports be produced by December 16, 2005. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 27). The Hospital's expert
reports were to be produced by February 3,2006. (ld.) On or about December 22, 2005, the
Suter Plaintiffs submitted a report from their liability expert, R. Lawrence Nicholson, who had
performed a "probe audit sample of all patient files for selected days of therapy within the period
of July 1, 1998 to October 1, 2000." (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 26). Based on this probe sample,
Nicholson concluded that all ofthe Hospital's TCD Medicare billings were improper, and he
calculated the resulting False Claims Act damages to be over $18 million. (Id.)
Luciani advised Taylor of the contents of the Nicholson report by telephone on January 3,
2006. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 18; Call Dec. Ex. 8; Luciani Depo. p. 40). He forwarded the
Nicholson report to Taylor on January 6, 2006. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 28). The approach taken by
the Suter Plaintiffs' expert dictated what the Hospital needed to do in response. (Tompkins Dec.
Ex. 30; Barry Depo. p. 136; Call Dec. Ex. 14; Pitts Depo. pp. 115-116; Tompkins Dec. Ex. 83,
p.7).

Taylor and Kee viewed the Hospital as facing an emergency. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 2;
Taylor Depo. p. 91; Dec. Ex. 30; Barry Depo. pp. 136-138; Kee Dec. Ex. 14; Kee Depo. pp. 158159). No damages expert had been retained yet by the Hospital. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 17;
Luciani Depo. pp. 45-46). John Groesbeck, the Hospital's CFO, recalled the Hospital's concern
was that "the case was not moving towards settlement." (Call Dec. Ex. 21; Groesbeck Depo.
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p. 96). Kee demanded that Taylor and Pitts find new counsel to represent the Hospital.
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 14; Kee Depo., pp. 158-159).
Pitts, who had little or no litigation experience, no experience in managing a team of
lawyers, and no experience in addressing Medicare fraud litigation, looked for new counsel.
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 34; Pitts Depo. pp. 20-22). By January 16,2006, Pitts had contacted the law
firm of McDermott, Will & Emory, LLP (McDermott) to represent the Hospital. (Tompkins
Dec. Ex. 31).
In the words of a McDermott senior partner David Rosenbloom, the Hospital "freaked
out" after receiving the Nicholson report. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 29; Call Dec. Ex. 14; Pitts Depo.
pp.68-69). Rosenbloom dismissed Nicholson's report on January 16, 2006 as "obviously a crap
damages analysis, since it is based on a 25 case probe sample!" (Id.) On January 18,2006,
Rosenbloom noted to Russell Hayman, a McDermott attorney who would head the Hospital's
defense of the Qui Tam claims with Rosenbloom, that McDermott "[c]an shoot holes in [the]
reports." (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 40; Hayman Depo. p. 5; Ex. 41). By January 18,2006,
McDermott had agreed to represent the Hospital with regard to the False Claims Act assertions if
a potential conflict could be resolved. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 32).
Simultaneously, on January 18, 2006, Pitts learned Luciani had obtained a 30-day
extension - until March 6, 2006 - to serve the Hospital's expert report. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 35).
Based on the advice of McDermott, Pitts contacted Georgeann Edford of Coding Compliance
Solutions (Ed ford) to respond to the Nicholson expert report. Ms. Edford advised she was used
to working on short time frames and could accommodate the schedule for filing an expert report.
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(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 36 & 37). A Retention Agreement between McDermott and the Hospital
was executed on January 30, 2006 for McDermott to defend the Hospital against the False
Claims Act allegations. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 33).
By March 5,2006, Edford had completed an audit of the Hospital's TCU files, and had
reported her findings to McDermott. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 40; Hayman Depo. pp. 36, 109, 117,
118 and 119). Based on Hayman's conference with Edford, he and Rosenblum reported to the
Hospital that Edford found "no net over reimbursement," directly contradicting the Suter
Plaintiff s allegations. (Id. at 117-119).
Mediation was conducted on March 6 and 7,2006. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 42). The Suter
Plaintiffs made an initial demand for $16.5 million. (Id.) The Hospital did not respond with a
counter-offer. (Jd.) Representing the Hospital at that mediation were McDermott attorneys
Rosenbloom and Hayman as well as its general counsel Taylor and Pitts. (Jd.) Luciani attended,
but he played no substantive role. (Jd.) Luciani later reported to the Hospital's insurer that the
mediator suggested the matter could have settled for $4 million. (Id.)
Pitts explains the Hospital offered nothing at mediation based on its reliance on
Ms. Edford's audit. (Call Dec. Ex. 14; Pitts Depo. pp. 38-39). The Hospital, according to
Ms. Pitts, had no liability on any ofthe Suter claims. (Jd.)
By March 10,2006, the Hospital had retained Patricia Olsson of Moffatt, Thomas,
Barrett, Rock & Fields (Moffatt Thomas), a Boise law firm, to replace Luciani to act as primary
counsel on the wrongful termination claims and as local counsel for McDermott on the Qui Tam
litigation. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 47 & 48). A substitution of counsel was filed on March 14,
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2006, removing Luciani as counsel of record and establishing Olsson and McDermott as the
Hospital's counsel of record. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 4). Olsson was local counsel on the Qui Tam
portion of the case being handled by McDermott, and Olsson defended the Hospital on the
wrongful termination part of the Suter Litigation. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 57).
Two days after the substitution of counsel was filed, on March 16, 2006, Twin Falls
County entered into its previously described Agreement with St. Luke's. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 7).
G.

The Hospital Did Not Advise Its Insurer ofthe Retention of McDermott Until
Mid-March 2006 and Truck Offered a Defense to St. Luke's Through Idaho
Counsel.

As noted by Pitts in a March 17, 2006 email to the Hospital's CEO Kee: "All fires have
been extinguished and the case is moving in a more favorable direction." (Tompkins Dec.
Ex. 46). By the time Luciani was removed as counsel, the alleged "emergency" was addressed,
and an audit had been conducted. The date for expert disclosures had again been extended until
March 24, 2006. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 43). A responsive expert report was timely served.
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 44, 45).
The Hospital did not advise Truck, its insurer, of its retention of McDermott, or its
dissatisfaction with Luciani, until mid-March 2006. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 55). Truck declined to
pay McDermott's fees and costs on the ground the Hospital incurred the expense for McDermott
voluntarily. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 56). Truck continued to defend St. Luke's through Olsson.
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 6, pp. 12-13).
During an exchange of communications between St. Luke's and Truck during the
summer of 2006, Truck, on July 31,2006, offered to provide a full defense to St. Luke's in the
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Qui Tam case through Idaho counsel other than McDermott. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 57, 59 & 60).
St. Luke's did not respond to Truck's offer. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 61).
H.

McDermott Billed Nearly $12 Million for Fees and Costs Over a Four-Year
Period.

After being substituted as counsel, McDermott defended against the Suter Plaintiffs' Qui

Tam claims for more than four years, incurring nearly $12 million in attorney's fees and costs.
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 8 p. 7; Ex. 32, 33 & 49). St. Luke's provided no formal billing guidelines to
McDermott. Pitts, who had limited experience reviewing billing entries, relied on McDermott's
assurances its billings were justified. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 34; Pitts Depo. pp. 22 & 23). Pitts
viewed McDermott's fees as justified because Qui Tam cases against a hospital are expensive to
litigate. (Call Dec. Ex. 14 Pitts Depo. pp. 109-11).
While Pitts complains that Luciani did not file a motion to dismiss when he was counsel,
she admits she does not know if such a motion would have been granted. (Id., pp. 183-185). She
deferred to Hayman any after-the-fact assessment on such issues. (Id.) Moreover, Pitts could
not calculate how costs would have changed if Luciani had represented the Hospital differently.
(Id., p. 121).

McDermott had submitted an initial budget in which it estimated initial defense efforts
would cost between $450,000 and $750,000. The completion of additional discovery, expert
consultations, non-dispositive motions and preparing for summary judgment was estimated to
require an additional expense of $500,000 to $750,000. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 33).
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Hayman, St. Luke's lead attorney in the Suter Litigation, testified that the original
McDermott budget for the Suter Litigation was an estimate. He stated the fees increased because
the course of the litigation changed "because of Nicholson's withdrawal, because of strategic and
tactical decisions that the [Suter Plaintiffs] made with respect to that withdrawal, because of
orders that the Court made with respect to the Nicholson withdrawal .... ,,3 (Tompkins Dec.
Ex. 40; Hayman Depo., pp. 31-32). Hayman acknowledged this "litigation, as with every
litigation, it takes on its own life ... in terms ofthe work undertaken." (Id., p. 32).
St. Luke's and the Suter Plaintiffs litigated a sanctions motion related to the replacement
of Nicholson. St. Luke's was awarded approximately $850,000 of approximately $1.5 million
sought as sanctions. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 50). St. Luke's also pursued motions for summary
judgment and Daubert motions. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 52 & 53).
I.

St. Luke's Settled Its Dispute With Truck and Settled the Suter Lawsuit for
$4.25 Million.

In November 2006, Truck filed a declaratory action asserting it had no duty to pay
McDermott's attorney's fees. St. Luke's counterclaimed, seeking its defense fees, costs and
extra-contractual damages. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 62, 63 & 64). Truck and St. Luke's settled their
dispute on November 25,2009. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 73). Truck paid St. Luke's $3.5 million in
exchange for St. Luke's agreement to release Truck from all claims, including any obligation to

3 The Suter Plaintiffs withdrew Nicholson as an expert because of discrepancies in his
CV. They substituted Ronald Clark, who opined that the False Claim Act liability was at least
$17.47 million. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 50 & 51).
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pay fees or costs incurred by McDermott in the Suter Plaintiffs' litigation, including fees or costs
incurred by Edford or her company, Coding Compliance Solutions. (!d.)
On April 6, 2010, St. Luke's agreed to settle the Suter Plaintiffs' litigation for $4.25
million. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 49; 54).
J.

After Settling, St. Luke's Seeks to Recover Millions From Luciani for His
Representation of Twin Falls County Prior to March 14, 2006.

St. Luke's has brought this legal malpractice action against Luciani for his representation
of the Hospital prior to March 14, 2006. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 1). It seeks to recover by this
lawsuit the $4.25 million it paid in settlement of the Suter Plaintiffs' litigation; $12 million in
attorney's fees it paid to McDermott (less amounts recovered from insurers and sanctions from
Suter Plaintiffs); and $2.7 million in fees paid to St. Luke's present counsel incurred in pursuit of
insurance proceeds and interest. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 8). It is also seeking to add a claim for
punitive damages. (Order, p. 4).

ARGUMENT
ST. LUKE'S SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED ON A CLAIM
OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST LUCIANI, WHO WAS NOT
ST. LUKE'S LAWYER.
A.

This Court's Review Is De Novo.

Luciani agrees with St. Luke's that the issue certified to this Court presents an issue of
law. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004). Luciani, however, asserts
that this Court should hold St. Luke's cannot proceed with its claim oflegal malpractice under
Idaho law.
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B.

There Was No Relationship Between Luciani and St. Luke's, But St. Luke's
Asserts It Can Proceed by Assignment.

In Idaho, "[a]s a general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to his or
her client and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client
relationship." Id., 140 Idaho at 134,90 P.3d at 887. Except in very narrow circumstances, this
Court has required a direct attorney-client relationship to exist between the plaintiff and the
attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action. ld.; Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 845,
243 P.3d 642, 661 (Idaho 2010) ("Harrigfeld is the only case in which this Court has found an
exception" to the requirement that there be an attorney-client relationship in order to sue an
attorney for legal malpractice).
S1. Luke's was never Luciani's client. There is no direct relationship between S1. Luke's
and Luciani, and there is no relationship between St. Luke's and Luciani which falls within the
Court's recognized narrow-excepted circumstances. Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 138,90 P.3d at
889. S1. Luke's seeks to proceed by assignment of such a claim from Twin Falls County. Under
Idaho law, "[a]n assignment of the chose in action transfers to the assignee and divests the
assignor of all control and right to the cause of action, and the assignee becomes the real party in
interest." Purco Fleet Services, Inc. v. Idaho State Dept. o/Finance, 140 Idaho 121, 126,90
P.3d 346, 351 (2004).
An assignment of legal malpractice claim is a relatively recent phenomenon, with the
seminal case of Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83,87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976),
decided in 1976. The majority of the jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have held legal
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malpractice claims are not assignable. Most courts have viewed the intimate nature of the
relationship between an attorney and his client to be the compelling policy reason to prohibit
such an assignment. Delaware ewe Liquidation Corp. v. Martin, 584 S.E.2d 473, 477-78 (W.
Va. 2003) (listing the cases across the country so holding). Luciani respectfully requests this
Court also so hold.
Where the propriety of an assignment of a legal malpractice cause of action has been
raised, courts generally address three issues. First, do legal malpractice claims sound in contract
or in tort? Historically, torts of a personal nature are not assignable. Second, however classified,
do legal malpractice claims survive the death of the claimant? Assignability has been equated
with survivability. Ifthe claim abates at death, it is not assignable. Third, iflegal malpractice
claims survive, are there countervailing public policy considerations that operate to invalidate the
assignment of such claims? The majority ofthe courts have held such assignments are contrary
to public policy. Addressing these factors, Luciani requests this Court hold any Twin Falls
County legal malpractice claim against him is not assignable.
C.

St. Luke's Claim Against Luciani Is Based in Tort.

This Court, in Bishop v. Owens, _

P.3d _,2012 WL 90134 (Idaho 2012), held that

while "legal malpractice actions are an amalgam of tort and contract theories," the "contract
basis oflegal malpractice actions is the failure to perform obligations directly specified in the
written contract." !d. at *3. Accordingly, "unless an attorney fool-heartedly contracts with his
client guaranteeing a specific outcome in the litigation or provides for a higher standard of care
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in the contract, he is held to the standard of care expected of an attorney. Breach of that duty is a
tort." Id. (internal citations omitted).
A claim for legal malpractice arises from the uniquely personal relationship between the
attorney and client, where the attorney has breached a personal duty owed to his or her client and
where the client has been injured as a result. Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 136-37, 90 P.3d at 886-87.
"The attorney's duty to his or her client must remain paramount." Id. at 140 Idaho at 138-39,90
P.3d at 888-89. Here, any claim against Luciani arises out oftort, not contract.
Because legal malpractice is a personal tort involving a confidential fiduciary relationship
of the very highest character, with an undivided duty of loyalty owed to the client, such claims
are not assignable. Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (fmding tort); Roberts v. Holland & Hart, 857
P.2d 492,495 (Colo. App. 1993), cert. denied ("the assignment oflegal malpractice claims
involve matters of personal trust and personal services and do not lend themselves to
assignability ... "); Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)
(allowing assignment oflegal malpractice claims "would be incompatible with the attorney's
duty to act loyally towards the client ... and to maintain confidentiality"); George L. Blum,

Assignability o/Claim/or Legal Malpractice, 64 A.L.R.6 th 473 at § 9 (2011).
In accord with Idaho law and the majority of jurisdictions to have addressed the issue of
assignability, Luciani requests this Court hold such claims are not assignable in Idaho.
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D.

At the Time of the Purported Assignment, Legal Malpractice Claims Did Not
Survive and, Therefore, Any Claimed Assignment is Unenforceable.

This Court has endorsed the common law rule that equated assignability with
survivability. MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 P. 254, 257 (1926) ("The assignability of a
cause of action is by the authorities intimately associated with, and in most cases held to depend
on the same principle as the survival of a cause of action."). At the time of the events at issuethe Twin Falls County/St. Luke's Agreement and even at the time of filing of this legal
malpractice action - Idaho did not have a general survival statute. The common law governed
the abatement of any claim for professional negligence. Under Idaho's common law, those
claims sounding in tort abate while claims arising out of contract generally survive the death of
the claimants. Bishop, _ _ P.3d _ _ _ 2012 WL 90134, citing Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho
667,34 P.2d 957,960-61 (1934); Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477, 477 (1919).
As this Court held in Bishop, under Idaho's common law a legal malpractice claim,
which sounds in tort, abates upon the client's death. _

P.3d _,2012 WL 90134. It does not

survive. Accordingly, St. Luke's assertion and discussion at pages 24-26 of its Appellant's Brief
claiming that under Idaho's common law, legal malpractice claims survive and are therefore
assignable, is incorrect. Any legal malpractice claim against Luciani is not assignable.
While the Idaho Legislature has amended Idaho Code Ann. § 5-327(2) to provide that
negligence claims, in which this Court includes legal malpractice claims, no longer abate on
death, this legislation is not retroactive. Bishop, 2012 WL 90134. As St. Luke's recognizes, this
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statute did not go into effect until July 1,2011. (Appellant's Brief, p. 26, n.7). It does not apply
to this action.
To the extent this Court has equated assignability with survivability under the common
law, any legal malpractice claim against Luciani is not assignable under Idaho law because such
claims did not survive the death of a client prior to the amendment of Idaho Code Ann.

§ 5-327(2).
E.

Even If a Legal Malpractice Claim Survives, It Is Not Assignable on Public
Policy Grounds.

Even though with the enactment ofIdaho Code Ann. § 5-327(2) a legal malpractice claim
now survives, there is no indication the Idaho Legislature intended a concomitant expansion of
the class of causes of action that are assignable. "Although a chose in action must survive to be
assignable, not every action that survives is assignable." Can Do, Inc. Pension and Profit

Sharing Plan and Successor Plans v. Manier, Herod, Hollabaugh & Smith, 922 S.W.2d 865, 867
(Tenn. 1996). Where there is legislation on survivability, survivability and assignability in most
jurisdictions have now been disconnected for purposes of determining the assignability of a legal
malpractice claim. Joos v. Drillock, 338 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that
Michigan's survival statute states "[a]ll actions and claims survive death[,]" but adopting the rule
that "survivability is not the only test" and concluding that legal malpractice claims were
unassignable based on public policy grounds); TMJ Hawaii, Inc. v. Nippon Trust Bank, 153 P.3d
444,455 nA (Haw. 2007) (listing cases across the country where the courts have held
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survivability a non-factor in the assignability analysis and explicitly abandoning reference to
survivability when analyzing assignability of a claim for relief).
The basis for finding a survivable cause of action non-assignable is public policy. Most
jurisdictions prohibit assignments of legal malpractice claims under any circumstances. Blum,
Assignability oJ Claim Jar Legal Malpractice, 64 A.L.R.6 Ih 473 (2011) (collecting cases). Public

policy considerations precluding the assignment of a legal malpractice action focus on the need
to preserve the sanctity of attorney-client relationships, the personal nature of the attorney-client
relationship, and the need to maintain the integrity of the judicial process. MNC Credit Corp. v.
Sickels, 497 S.E.2d 331, 334 (Va. 1998); Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Minn.

Ct. App. 1993).
1.

Whether a legal malpractice claim is assignable is a decision to be
made by this Court.

St. Luke's suggests, citing Idaho Code Ann. § 55-402, that this Court should defer to the
Idaho Legislature in determining whether a legal malpractice claim is assignable. (Appellant's
Brief, pp. 22-24, 29-31). But this Court has the inherent power to regulate the bar and has been
ever mindful of its role in ensuring the sanctity of and safeguarding the attorney-client
relationship. Malmin v. Oths, 126 Idaho 1024, 1029,895 P.2d 1217, 1221-22 (1995) ("Since
territorial days, the regulation ofthe practice oflaw in Idaho has been the province of the
judiciary."); Application oJKauJman, 69 Idaho 297, 308, 206 P.2d 528, 539 (1949) (noting that
in 1895 this Court invoked its inherent authority to admit the first woman to the Idaho bar in
direct opposition to legislative enactments then limiting the practice to white males). Other State
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Supreme Courts have rejected such a "deference to the legislature" argument, given the
judiciary's role in regulating the practice oflaw. Can Do, Inc. Pension and Profit Sharing Plan

and Successor Plans, 922 S.W.2d at 868 (concluding it was appropriate for Tennessee Supreme
Court to resolve assignment issue because the court has exclusive original jurisdiction over
matters relating to the practice oflaw); Delaware CWC Liquidation Corp. v. Martin, 584 S.E.2d
473,478 (W. Va. 2003) (one of the court's unique functions involves regulating the special
relationship of attorney and client).
A statute similar to Idaho Code Ann. § 55-402 existed in California, which the California

Goodley court addressed in denying the assignment of a legal malpractice claim.

In 1872, our Legislature effected a change in the common law rule
of nonassignability of choses in action by enacting sections 953
and 954, Civil Code. Thus, a thing in action arising out of either
the violation of a right of property or an obligation or contract may
be transferred. The construction and application of the broad rule
of assignability have developed a complex pattern of case law
underlying which is the basic public policy that "[a]ssignability of
things in action is now the rule; nonassignability, the exception."
133 Cal. Rptr. at 84 (internal citations omitted). Despite this statute, the California court
concluded that its view "that a chose in action for legal malpractice is not assignable is
predicated on the uniquely personal nature oflegal services and the contract out of which a
highly personal and confidential attorney-client relationship arises, and public policy
considerations based thereon." !d. at 86. Luciani respectfully requests that the Court reach the
same result here.
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Moreover, for § 55-402 to apply, a legal malpractice cause of action must be "a thing in
action arising out of the violation of a right of property or out of an obligation." Idaho Code
Ann. § 55-402. Given this Court's ruling in Bishop, _

P.3d _,2012 WL 90134, that a legal

malpractice claim abates on one's death, this Court necessarily concluded a legal malpractice
cause of action is not a "thing in action" under the statute. "Right of property" and "obligation"
refer to property and contractual rights rather than tort claims.
St. Luke's cites to the Court of Appeals' discussion in Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104
Idaho 234, 657 P .2d 1102 (1983). Bonanza Motors did not involve an assignment of a legal
malpractice claim. In Bonanza Motors, the Court of Appeals, in addressing what may be
assigned under § 55-402, states "an attorney-client relationship generally imposes upon a law
firm a contractual obligation, analogous to that of an agent or trustee, to account for funds
received in the course oflegal representation." 104 Idaho at 236,657 P.2d at 1104. The Court
of Appeals held the client's interests in proceeds of a settlement were assignable to a creditor to
whom the client owed money on a delinquent promissory note. Id. As discussed by this Court in
Bishop, _

P.3d _,2012 WL 90134, the attorney-client relationship here is premised on tort

not contract. And the claim here is not "analogous to that of an agent or trustee, to account for
funds received in the course oflegal representation," which was the limited situation addressed
by the Court of Appeals in Bonanza Motors.
Given this Court's role in safeguarding the attorney-client relationship, the issue before
the Court should not be decided based on Idaho Code Ann. § 55-402.
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2.

Assignment should be rejected based on the unique character of legal
services.

This Court has consistently acknowledged the intimate nature of the attorney-client
relationship. See Harrigfeld, 90 P.3d at 886. It is the unique character oflegal services, the
personal nature ofthe attorney's duty to the client and the confidentiality of the attorney-client
relationship which has, as previously stated, led courts across the country to reject assignment.

Gurski v. Rosenblum and Fi/an, LLC, 885 A.2d 163, 169 (Conn. 2005) (citing cases so holding);
Delaware CWC Liquidation Corp., 584 S.E.2d at 477-78 (citing cases and stating "[i]t is beyond
cavil that this Court recognizes the attorney-client relationship to be of the highest fiduciary
nature" and "this Court is ever mindful of its role in ensuring that the sanctity of this confidential
relationship is preserved and protected"); Taylor v. Babin, 13 So.3d 633, 639 (La. Ct. App. 2009)
(finding "the common theme in cases holding that legal malpractice claims are not assignable is
that the relationship between an attorney and his client is a fiduciary relationship of the very
highest character, and it binds the attorney to most conscientious fidelity"); Roberts v. Holland &

Hart, 857 P.2d 492,495 (Colo. App. 1993) ("the assignment oflegal malpractice claims involve
matters of personal trust and personal service and do not lend themselves to assignability").
In Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87, in holding the cause of action for legal malpractice was
not assignable, the California court stated:
It is the unique quality of legal services, the personal nature of the
attorney's duty to the client and the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship that invoke public policy considerations in our
conclusion that malpractice claims should not be subject to
assignment.
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The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in also refusing to permit assignment of a legal malpractice
claim in Coffeyv. Jefferson CountyBd. ofEduc., 756 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988),
relied on the decision in Goodley, quoting:
Our view that a chose in action for legal malpractice is not
assignable is predicated on the uniquely personal nature of legal
services and the contract out of which a highly personal and
confidential attorney-client relationship arises.

See also Assoc. Ins. Service, Inc. v. Garcia, 307 S.W.3d 58,63 (Ky. 2010), as modified, reh 'g
denied (recognizing "exception to the general rule that a claim may be assigned has been created
for legal malpractice claims"); Earth Science Labs., Inc. v. Adkins & Wondra, P.e., 523 N.W.2d
254,257 (Neb. 1994) (refusing to permit assignment because of "personal nature and
confidentiality involved in attorney-client relationship"); Delaware CWC Liquidation Corp., 584
S.E.2d at 477 ("[t]o permit the assignment of a claim that is firmly rooted in the highly personal
attorney-client relationship would denigrate both the legal profession and the justice system");

Chaffee v. Smith, 645 P.2d 966 (Nev. 1982) (public policy prevents transfer of malpractice claim
because right is personal to client).
There is an incompatibility between the voluntary assignment of a legal malpractice
claim and an attorney's duty ofloyalty and duty to maintain client confidentiality. Can Do, Inc.

Pension and Profit Sharing Plan and Successor Plans, 922 S.W.2d at 869. An attorney owes a
fiduciary and ethical duty to his or her client. Based on this Court's historical view that the
relationship between attorney and client is a highly personal and fiduciary relationship, this
Court should, like the maj ority of courts, preclude an assignment of a legal malpractice claim.
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3.

Assignments undermine the attorney-client relationship.

Moreover, assignments undermine the attorney-client relationship in two essential ways.
Assignments would eliminate the attorney's duty of confidentiality by creating circumstances
where the client's control over the attorney's disclosure of confidential information would be
lost; at minimum, the possibility of an assignment would inhibit transfer of information between
the attorney and the client. Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87; Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d
338,343-44 (Ind. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178 (Ind.
2007) (affirming lower court's grant of summary judgment on legal malpractice claim on
grounds that assignment of claim to former adversary was contrary to public policy); Wagener,
509 N.W.2d at 192.
When a client sues an attorney for malpractice, the attorney may utilize confidential
information revealed by the client to defend against the claim. Idaho Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.6(b)( 5). Because the client may stop the malpractice litigation at any point, the client
controls the confidential information release. Rosby Corp. v. Townsend, Yosha, Cline & Price,
800 N.E.2d 661,666 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); see Picadilly, 582 N.E.2d at 343. When a client
assigns a claim for legal malpractice, however, the client has no further rights in the action. See
Purco Elect. Service, 90 P .3d at 351 (assignor is divested of all control and right to the cause of

action). The client has no right to force the withdrawal of the assignee's legal malpractice suit to
prevent disclosure of confidential information. Id. The potential for assignment may cause a
client to restrict an attorney's access to valuable information in a preemptive effort to prevent
future disclosure should an assignment become advantageous. Picadilly, 582 N.E.2d at 343.
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The weakening of the confidential duty holds true regardless of the client's level of
sophistication. Id. at 343. "Far-sighted clients would be encouraged to withhold damaging
information from their attorney in order to preserve their ability to sell off a malpractice claim
without the fear oflosing control over the information." !d. Clients who do not anticipate this
possibility of future disclosure may be blind-sided by the disclosure of confidential information
in the event the assigned legal malpractice claim goes forward. Id.
Assignments jeopardize the attorney's duty ofloyalty by creating conflicts of interest
between the attorney and the client. Id. at 342; Taylor, 13 So.3d at 641 ("the mere threat of a
malpractice claim being assigned would be detrimental to an attorney's duty of loyalty and
confidentiality"); Roberts, 857 P.2d at 495 ("We are also concerned that an attorney's duty of
loyalty to his client could be compromised by anticipating an assignment of possible legal
malpractice claims. ").
The classic occurrence arises in settlement negotiations. An adversary unable to collect a
judgment may agree to a settlement in exchange for assignment of any legal malpractice claims
the opposing party may have against his attorney. The adversary then seeks to obtain a judgment
against the attorney. Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex. Ct. App.
1966). The attorney is faced with a dilemma. The attorney's duty ofloyalty runs only to the
client. However, in accepting the favorable offer to the client, the attorney makes himself a
target for future litigation. The client's interest in accepting a favorable settlement offer,
extinguishing his liability, is contrary to the attorney's interest in avoiding a lawsuit. Id.
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In essence, assignments could become a "bargaining chip in the negotiation of
settlements - particularly for clients without a deep pocket," as "[a]n adversary might well make
a favorable settlement offer to a judgment-proof or financially strapped client in exchange for the
assignment of that client's right to bring a malpractice claim against [the] attorney." State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estep, 873 N .E.2d 1021, 1026 n.9 (Ind. 2007), quoting Picadilly, 582

N.E.2d at 342-43. These concerns can directly or subjectively influence an attorney's loyalty,
dedication and zeal in pursuing his client's claims. Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 317.
4.

Assignments increase litigation.

Beyond the personal nature ofthe suit and the breaches of duty and confidentiality, the
assignment oflegal malpractice claims, if permitted, increases litigation. Goodley, 133 Cal.
Rptr. at 87.
Here, Twin Falls County's exposure in the Suter litigation was a factor in the price
received from St. Luke's for Twin Falls County assets. St. Luke's bought into the exposure and
negotiated for its cost. Twin Falls County was able to sell the Suter Litigation risk to St. Luke's.
Twin Falls was not damaged. Nevertheless St. Luke's has pursued this lawsuit against Luciani.
Other courts have agreed with the concerns raised in Goodley, expressing a concern that
the assignment oflegal malpractice claims will lead to a number of frivolous claims that seek to
tap the "deep pockets" of the attorneys and their malpractice insurers. In Moorhouse v.
Ambassador Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985), the Michigan court upheld its

prior decision precluding the assignment of a legal malpractice claim. Speaking of its earlier
decision, the Moorhouse court explained:
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[T]he Court carefully analyzed the policy consideration attendant
to the issue of whether a legal malpractice action ought to be
assignable. The Court concluded that a legal malpractice action is
not assignable because of the personal nature of the attorney-client
relationship and because assignment of such claims would relegate
the legal malpractice action to the marketplace, which would
encourage unjustified suits, increase legal malpractice litigation,
and force attorneys to defend themselves against strangers .... We
decline to hold [that our earlier decision] was wrongly decided.
Id. at 221.

Assignments create a marketplace for legal malpractice claims that is inherently
detrimental to the legal profession. Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87; Delaware CWC Liquidation
Corp., 584 S.E.2d at 479 (citing cases so concluding). In Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 316, the Texas

court echoed a common theme: "We do not relish the thought of entrepreneurs purchasing the
legal rights of clients against their attorneys as an ordinary business transaction in pursuit of
profit." The leading case prohibiting assignments of legal malpractice claims, Goodley, voiced
similar concerns, stating "[t]he commercial aspect of assignability of choses in action arising out
oflegal malpractice is rife with probabilities that could only debase the legal profession." Id. at
133 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
Characterizing the assignment as a commercial transaction, as St. Luke's does, does not
eliminate this public policy concern. For example, in InLiner Americas, Inc. v. Macomb
Funding Group, LLC, 348 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010), the Texas Court of Appeals rejected

the contemplated transfer of a legal malpractice claim accomplished in the context of transfer of
assets in a commercial setting. The Texas Court of Appeals concluded that the contemplated suit
would demean the profession by creating a marketplace for the sale and resale of malpractice
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claims. Allowing such transfers could foment lawsuits against attorneys by encouraging
creditors to look at potential malpractice claims as an alternative way of capturing funds. Id.
at 8.
5.

Assignments impact negatively on the public's perception of the legal
profession.

Assignments can require attorneys to advocate patently contradictory positions in
successive proceedings. This reinforces negative public perception of the legal profession. In

Aleman Services Corp. v. Bullock, 925 F. SUpp. 252, 255 (D.N.J. 1996), afJ'd 124 F.3d 185 (3rd
Cir. 1997), a judgment-proof defendant suffered a $7 million default judgment to the plaintiff.
The defendant then assigned any potential legal malpractice claim against his attorney to the
plaintiff and the plaintiff assignee sued the attorney for legal malpractice. The litigants' position
and the Court's negative reaction is illustrated in the following passage:

In obtaining its $7 million default judgment ... [plaintiff] filed an
affidavit swearing that [defendant] rightfully owed [plaintiff] the
full $7 million. [Plaintiff-assignee] now seeks to come before this
court and argue, in essence, that [defendant] did not actually owe
the full $7 million, but, rather, that some portion of that $7 million
was the result of [the attorney's] malpractice.
925 F. SUpp. at 256. The Zuniga court stated that "[f]or the law to countenance this abrupt and
shameless shift of positions would give prominence (and substance) to the image that lawyers
will take any position depending upon where the money lies, and that litigation is a mere game
and not a search for the truth." 878 S.W.2d at 318.
Iflegal malpractice claims are assignable, "lawyers [might] be reluctant to take difficult
cases because of the risk that they [would] be viewed as a source of collecting the defendants'

30

costs on the plaintiffs' judgment." Ronald E. Mallen, Duty to Nonclients: Exploring the
Boundaries, 37 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1147, 1165 (1996). Courts prohibiting assignment agree that the
restriction oflegal services to all but clients with sufficient assets is contrary to public policy.
Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 318.
The court in Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87, stated that assignments "would most surely
result in a selective process for carefully choosing clients thereby rendering a disservice to the
public and the profession." This concern was reiterated in Alcman Services Corp., 925 F. Supp.
at 258-59 (allowing assignments "would make insolvent, underinsured, judgment-proof
defendants extremely unattractive clients, thereby making it harder for them to obtain legal
representation").
The Court cannot ignore the very real possibility that clients will begin colluding with
other parties. A client may intentionally sacrifice his attorney-client relationship in order to
settle the original claim without his attorney even knowing their relationship has been
compromised. Can Do, Inc. Pension and Profit Sharing Plan and Successor Plans, 922 S.W.2d
at 869 ("[a]ssignment would undermine the fundamental structure and function of the
relationship and create a risk of collusion that must not be countenanced"); see Alcman Services
Corp., 925 F. Supp. at 258; Coffey, 756 S.W.2d at 157; Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d at
191. In Coffey v. Jefferson County Bd. oJEduc., 756 S.W.2d at 156, for example, the defendant
appeared in court with the plaintiff, confessed to a $1 million judgment, and immediately
attempted to assign his legal malpractice claim against his attorney to the plaintiff The court
refused to allow the assignment because of the appearance of collusion. !d.
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F.

The Fact That St. Luke's Chose to Assume the Suter Litigation by Contract
Does Not Eliminate the Public Policy Reasons for Precluding the Assignment
of Legal Malpractice Claims.

St. Luke's asks this Court to ignore all the public policy reasons that have been
enunciated by courts across the country and hold this legal malpractice claim is assignable
because it is a "successor" to a predecessor business. (Order, pp. 2-3). The characterization of
"successor" is commonly used when a party seeks to hold an existing entity liable for certain
obligations of an entity that no longer exists or is otherwise unable to pay the claim. Cases
commonly involve a successor's alleged exposure for a predecessor's products claim,
environmental claims, and collective bargaining obligations. See, e.g., Turner v. Bituminous

Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873,883-84 (Mich. 1976); Us. v. Gen. Battery Corp. Inc., 423 F.3d 294,
300-01 (3rd Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom Exide Tech v. US., 549 U.S. 941 (2006); John

Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549-51 (1964). That label of "successor" does
not apply here.
The Hospital was owned by Twin Falls County at the time of Luciani's representation.
Twin Falls County still exists. This was not a merger transaction in which, by operation oflaw,
the surviving corporation succeeds to all the attributes of the predecessor "disappearing"
corporation. There is no reason why a wholly independent purchasing entity, at arms' length to
the seller, should inherit the attributes of the seller's attorney-client relationship merely because
the transaction included sufficient assets of the seller to enable the purchaser to continue some
discrete portion of the seller's business. But that is St. Luke's "successor" argument and Luciani
respectfully requests the Court reject that argument.
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1.

Other courts have acknowledged the same public policy considerations apply to preclude a legal malpractice assignment based on a
company's purchase of another's assets.

Courts have rejected the notion that public policy considerations change because, under
the facts of the case, the party seeking to assert a legal malpractice claim based on an assignment
purchased another company's assets. In Earth Science Labs., Inc., 523 N.W.2d at 257, the
Nebraska Supreme Court explained:

In this case, the defendant [attorneys] owed no duty to the plaintiff
[purchasing corporation], who was not a client, and the plaintiff
[purchasing corporation] did not acquire that duty through its
purchase of the assets of [the seller] because of the personal nature
and confidentiality involved in the attorney-client relationship.
ld. at 257.

In Virginia, in its case establishing the rule of nonassignability, the legal malpractice
claims in issue had been assigned to the plaintiff corporation by a sister subsidiary corporation
pursuant to an asset purchase agreement. MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels, 497 S.E.2d 331, 332 n.1
(Va. 1998). The sister corporation, not the plaintiff, had once been the client of the defendant
law firm. ld. at 332. The Virginia Supreme Court quoted extensively from the seminal case of
Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87, which explained that permitting assignments oflegal malpractice
claims would lead to the undesirable "merchandizing" of such claims, and thus "encourage
unjustified lawsuits against members of the legal profession, generate an increase in legal
malpractice litigation, promote champerty and force attorneys to defend themselves against
strangers." ld. at 333-34.
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The Virginia Supreme Court held that the rule which prohibits the assignment oflegal
malpractice claims "safeguards the attorney-client relationship, which is an indispensable
component of our adversarial system of justice." ld. at 334. The Virginia Supreme Court
adopted a bright line rule against the assignment of legal malpractice claims. Luciani requests
this Court do the same. See Rosby Corp. v. Townsend, Yosha, Cline & Price, 800 N.E.2d 661,
664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing a bright line drawn that no legal malpractice claims may
be assigned, regardless of whether they are assigned to an adversary).
In New Falls Corp. v. Lerner, 352 Fed. Appx. 596, 597-98 (2nd Cir. 2009), a client-

corporation attempted to transfer all of its rights, title, interest and assets in the corporation to the
successor corporation, including its interest in an underlying cause of action, through a loan
purchase agreement. The successor corporation then brought a cause of action for legal
malpractice against the predecessor's attorney for allegedly failing to perfect an attachment
against real property which formed the basis of the underlying lawsuit. !d. at 597. The
agreement provided that it was to be construed pursuant to California law. ld.
Noting California's well-established prohibition on the assignability oflegal malpractice
claims, the Federal District Court concluded that the assignment of rights in the loan enforcement action could not have included an assignment of a potential legal malpractice claim. New
Falls Corp. v. Lerner, 579 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288-89 (D. Conn. 2008). On appeal, the appellate

court affirmed the district court's dismissal ofthe legal malpractice claim. New Falls Corp., 352
Fed. Appx. at 597. The Court of Appeals agreed that the assignment of potential legal
malpractice claims was void, citing California's emphatic public policy prohibiting such an
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assignment, stating that the assignee-corporation "was attempting to enforce a right that it did not
have" and held that the transaction was barred at the outset so a transfer of the legal malpractice
claim never occurred. ld. at 598.
Rejecting the minority of jurisdictions that have allowed the voluntary assignment of
legal malpractice claims on a case-by-case basis, and specifically mentioning the cases cited by
St. Luke's to this Court, the West Virginia Supreme Court in Delaware ewc Liquidation Corp.,
584 S.E.2d at 479, likewise concluded:
We are not persuaded by the reasoning of the small number of
courts which have allowed the assignment of legal malpractice
claims. It is of particular concern to this Court that the relationship
between an attorney and his client remain a confidential, fiduciary
relationship of the very highest character. ... To permit the
assignment of a claim that is firmly rooted in the highly personal
attorney-client relationship would denigrate both the legal profession and the justice system. We will not allow this most certain
consequence. Accordingly, we hold that the assignment of a legal
malpractice claim is contrary to the public policy of West Virginia.
Therefore, any such assignment is void as a matter oflaw.

ld. at 479; see also Law Office oJDavid J Stein v. Security Nat 'I Servicing Corp., 969 So.2d 962,
968-69 (Fla. 2007), reh 'g denied (rejecting minority case-by-case approach).
3.

This Court should reject the minority view asserted by St. Luke's.

St. Luke's primarily relies on Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, 728 A.2d
1057, 1059-60 (R.!. 1999), Richter v. Analex Corp., 940 F. Supp. 353, 358 (D.D.C. 1996), and

Hedlund MJg. CO. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1988), in support of its
position that this Court should permit the assignment of a legal malpractice claim here.
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Cerberus is a Rhode Island case holding that "the assignment of legal malpractice claims

as an integral part of a larger commercial transaction" is permissible. 728 A.2d at 1059-60. In
so holding, the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated: "On the specific factual circumstances
present in this case, where an assignee of a commercial loan agreement brings a legal
malpractice action against the attorney who represented the original lender in the commercial
loan transaction, the assignment of that negligence claim, if arising from the assigned
commercial loan agreement, is not prohibited by Rhode Island law." ld. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court relied in part on its earlier decision holding the Rhode Island Depositors
Economic Protection Corp. acquired the attorney-client privilege along with other assets that
formerly belonged to the financial institutions it took over in the banking crisis. !d, at 1061. The
Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded "[p]resumably, if the attorney-client privilege was
transferred ... so too was any right to bring an action for legal malpractice." ld. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court therefore concluded in Cerberus such an assignment was consistent with
previously enunciated Rhode Island law. ld.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court ultimately does not offer a convincing rationale for
vesting an arm's length purchase with the incidents ofthe seller's attorney-client relationship.
With regard to assignment, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concludes an assignment of a bare
legal claim for malpractice is somehow different from the assignment of a malpractice claim that
is "part of a general assignment in a commercial setting." !d. at I 060. As stated previously,
other jurisdictions have rejected such a distinction. Delaware CWC Liquidation Corp., 584
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S.E.2d at 479. And unlike Rhode Island, this Court's previous enunciations do not support such
an assignment.
In Richter, the Federal District Court acknowledged the majority of courts have
concluded that assignment of legal malpractice claims is not permissible, but distinguished the
case before it, in part, because the liabilities that were assumed arose directly out of the
attorney's conduct. 940 F. Supp. at 358. It should be noted in denying the motion to dismiss, the
court left to further factual development whether the terms of the purchase agreement between
the old and new corporation should be construed as assigning the claim against the attorney to
the new corporation. Id.
Here, the Agreement contained no explicit or implicit reference to the assignment of a
legal malpractice claim. Although St. Luke's was aware of the Suter Litigation and the alleged
"emergency" created by Luciani's failure to identify a rebuttal expert to the Nicholson report, the
assignment of a legal malpractice claim was not identified in the Agreement. The purported
assignment of a legal malpractice claim was not consummated in a separate assignment
agreement during the asset purchase transaction, although Twin Falls County and St. Luke's
executed other assignment agreements. "In order to determine the intent of the assignment, the
court looks to the contract between the assignor and assignee." Purco Fleet Service, Inc., 90
P.3d at 351. An effective assignment must describe the subject matter of the assignment with
sufficient particularity to render it capable of identification. The parties' failure to reference
legal malpractice claims in the Agreement, and to execute transactional documents as with other
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assigned rights and liabilities, renders the alleged assignment insufficiently specific to be given
any effect.
Moreover, looking at the terms ofthe Agreement as a whole, such an assignment is
contrary to its terms. There is a provision in the Agreement with Twin Falls County to change
the price ofthe deal if the Suter Litigation was not reasonably valued in that Agreement.
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 7 at Art. XV). Because Twin Falls County was able to sell this risk to
St. Luke's, Twin Falls County sustained no damage due to any purported negligence by Luciani
unless it could show it would have derived a better purchase price from St. Luke's than it
received. That claim has not been made by Twin Falls County.
The Agreement also means that the amount paid with regard to the Suter Litigation was
paid by Twin Falls County, not St. Luke'S, because the price was paid in the Agreement in the
form of reduced consideration. The fact that St. Luke's has not exercised its right under the
Agreement to adjust the purchase price with Twin Falls County means the ultimate cost was
within the range accounted for in the transaction.
St. Luke's also relies inappropriately on Hedlund MJg. Co., 539 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1987), to
argue that it is entitled to bring a legal malpractice claim against Luciani. In Hedlund, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the concept of the attorney-client relationship
should not be used as a shield by an attorney to protect him or her from the consequences of
legal malpractice. Id. at 359. However, this rationale was debunked in Wagener, 509 N.W.2d at
192, where the Minnesota Court of Appeals explained that the "shield theory" is not relevant
because the actual client would not be precluded from filing a legal malpractice claim; the only
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claim being precluded was the assignment or marketing of a legal malpractice claim. Taylor, 13
So. 3d at 641 (also rejecting shield argument).
Likewise, St. Luke's "shield" argument should be rejected here. Contrary to St. Luke's
assertion, Luciani's client Twin Falls County survives and it, if it were damaged, would have
been the proper party to assert a claim against Luciani. Tate v. Goins, Underkojler, Crawford &

Langdon, 24 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (invalidity of assignment does not preclude client
from bringing legal malpractice claim against former attorney).
Luciani respectfully requests this Court reject the minority view espoused by St. Luke's
and hold such assignment is contrary to Idaho law.

G.

An Asset Purchase Does Not Transfer an Attorney-Client Relationship and
Twin Falls County Had Nothing to Assign.

Finally, it cannot be ignored that Twin Falls County had no legal malpractice action to
assign. An assignee can take no more than the assignor has to assign. Cobb Bank & Trust Co. v.

American ManuJacturers Mut. Ins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 328,334 (N.D. Ga. 1978), ajJ'd 624 F.2d
722 (5th Cir. 1980). A legal assignment relates to a thing in being. An equitable assignment
relates to contingent interests and expectancies. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments § 5 (2012); Keeley v.

Indemnity Co. ojAmerica, 7 S.W.2d 434,437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928), reh 'g denied (assignment of
thing not in existence gives only equitable right). This Court has not recognized equitable
assignments. Sirius LC v. Erickson, 150 Idaho 80, 86, 244 P .3d 224, 230 (Idaho 2010), reh 'g

denied; Casady v. Scott, 40 Idaho 137,237 P. 415, 421 (Idaho 1924), reh 'g denied ("A legal
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assignment of mere naked possibilities or expectancies, not coupled with an interest, has never
been recognized ... "). Here, there was nothing to assign.
Fundamentally, the purchase of assets did not transfer an attorney-client relationship. See
SMI Indus. Canada, Ltd. v. Caelter Indus., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 808, 815-16 (N.D.N.Y. 1984)

(plaintiffs argument [that by virtue of being an assignee ofthe defendant's parent corporation it
succeeds to the rights of the law firm's former client] is "without merit and unsupported by the
case law"); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. McAtee, 124 F.R.D. 662, 664 (D. Kan. 1988); In re
Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1976). And a corporation that

acquires the assets of another is generally not liable for the torts of its predecessor. Travis v.
Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443,446 (7th Cir. 1977). St. Luke's exposure to the Suter Plaintiffs'

litigation occurred because it chose to assume that liability as currency for the purchase and lease
of assets, instead of leaving that liability with Twin Falls County and paying more cash for
assets. Id. (recognizing exception to general rule where there is an express agreement of
assumption).
St. Luke's could only acquire a legal malpractice claim that had accrued to Twin Falls
County and against Luciani before the closing of the Asset Purchase Agreement. St. Luke's did
not have an attorney-client relationship with Luciani. Luciani's relationship only existed with
Twin Falls County. St. Luke's can only pursue, if anything, those damages sustained by Twin
F aIls County.
Twin Falls County's dissatisfaction with Luciani's services would not, by itself, create a
cause of action. Negligence alone does not warrant a recovery for a client in a legal malpractice

40

case, as there must also be damage proximately resulting from an attorney's malpractice. A
cause of action cannot arise for legal malpractice until damages are incurred. City of McCall v.

Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 661, 201 P.3d 629, 634 (2009).
As the facts ofthis case make clear, at the time Luciani was discharged as counsel the
underlying Suter Litigation was in process and about four years from resolution under the
management of substitute counsel. No harm from any aspect of the defense of the case had
accrued to Twin Falls County. Indeed, Twin Falls County was successful in transferring the risk
in the sale of the Hospital assets and had not incurred any damages. Thus, there was nothing to
assign to St. Luke's because there was no cause of action and Twin Falls County could not grant
that which it did not have.
St. Luke's even goes so far as to assert it can claim punitive damages against Luciani.
Punitive damages are "damages awarded to a claimant, over and above what will compensate the
claimant for actual personal injury and property damage, to serve the public policies of punishing
a defendant for outrageous conduct and of deterring future like conduct." Idaho Code Ann.

§ 6-1601(9); Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital, Inc., 122 Idaho 47,52,830 P.2d 1185,
1190 (Idaho 1992), reh 'g denied. Assuming Twin Falls County possessed such a claim, it
certainly is not assignable. See Summit Account & Computer Service, Inc. v. RJH of Florida,

Inc., 690 N.E.2d 723, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), reh'g denied (recognizing neither punitive
damages nor legal malpractice claims are assignable). The Nevada Supreme Court in Chaffee,
645 P.2d at 966, refused, as a matter of public policy, to permit enforcement of a legal
malpractice action by transfer which was never pursued by the client.

41

Neither present law nor public policy supports S1. Luke's action against Luciani. Luciani
respectfully requests this Court hold St. Luke's cannot proceed against Luciani.
CONCLUSION
Respondent/Defendant Luciani and his law firm respectfully request this Court answer
the certified question in the negative. No legal malpractice claim against Luciani was assignable.
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